Tag: Hospitals

  • Opinion: I’m a doctor. Here’s what I want the public to know about AI tools and health care costs

    Opinion: I’m a doctor. Here’s what I want the public to know about AI tools and health care costs

    When Blue Cross Blue Shield recently published research suggesting that hospitals use artificial intelligence tools to extract more money from insurers without providing additional care, people were mad. Amid growing concerns about AI, one glimmer of hope has been its potential to improve health — and yet, here it was: inflating health care costs without yielding any benefits.

    As a doctor who has used the kinds of tools being criticized, I’m frustrated, too: We can document honestly and still wind up inflating hospital bills. This is because comorbidities function as an on-off switch with respect to billing, even though they affect patient care in nuanced ways.

    Although the problem warrants a systemic fix, the best short-term solution is for hospitals to create more nuanced documentation tools, and for clinicians to exercise judgment when using them.

    What did the research show?

    BCBS suggested hospitals are using automated tools to document secondary diagnoses — like anemia, malnutrition, and low sodium — which allow them to charge more for caring for these patients.

    For instance, a patient might be admitted for diverticulitis (primary diagnosis), but found on post-op labs to have acute blood-loss anemia (secondary diagnosis). Hospitals can use these secondary diagnoses to label a patient as having a comorbidity or a complication, allowing them to bill more for the hospitalization, whether or not they treated the patient’s anemia. These “bump codes” have cost BCBS hundreds of millions of dollars over the past two years, and these costs are presumably passed along to patients in the form of higher premiums.

    BCBS claims that bump coding has become more widespread because hospitals are using AI tools to identify secondary diagnoses. Automated tools can skim a patient’s chart and prompt physicians to document that the patient is, for instance, anemic, and what they are doing about it.

    Are doctors to blame?

    A few weeks after I started medical residency, I began getting emails from hospital administrators I had never met, whose signatures said they were risk adjustment specialists. The emails were generic and polite, advising me to review clinical documentation integrity (CDI) queries on inpatients I was caring for. If I didn’t respond quickly, the request would be forwarded to the attending physician supervising me. A typical CDI query would point out that my note hadn’t commented on, say, a patient’s low sodium level, and would ask me to document that they had low sodium and what (if anything) we were doing about it.

    Like most residents, I was already spending far more time on my computer than I was with my patients. Soon, CDI queries streamed into my inbox with such regularity that I turned to a more senior doctor to ask how I might stave them off. That doctor showed me an automated tool that I could include in my notes. This tool would assess a patient’s lab results, automatically detect any additional diagnoses a patient had (like anemia, malnutrition, or low sodium), and prompt me to specify whether we were monitoring, evaluating, or treating.

    I assumed it was lucrative to the hospital for me to document these diagnoses (why else would they be paying risk adjustment specialists to email me about them?), but we almost always were at least monitoring the secondary diagnosis in question, and I accurately documented as much.

    Including this tool’s outputs in my notes kept the risk adjustment specialists from hounding me and won me back several minutes of each day — enough time to poke my head into a patient’s room before I went home, or call a patient’s family member to give a quick update. I always answered the questions included in my tool honestly, but in the back of my mind, I wondered whether I was doing my patients a disservice: Was I inflating the cost of their hospitalizations without actually improving their care?

    Where bump codes come from

    In general, hospitals are reimbursed for hospitalizing patients on the basis of diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs. DRG payments are set by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services by analyzing claims data. (Medicare uses DRGs to set payments, while many commercial insurers, including BCBS, use the DRG system to negotiate reimbursement rates with hospitals.) Let’s say a patient is admitted with diverticulitis requiring surgery (typically billed as DRG 331 if there are no complications). CMS has estimated how much it usually costs to care for one of these patients and insurers prospectively pay hospitals on that basis; a hospital generally won’t get reimbursed more for keeping the patient longer, administering more drugs, placing more IVs, and so on.

    However, some hospitals care for sicker patients than others. The typical diverticulitis patient at a tertiary medical center in a poor area will require more support than a diverticulitis patient at a community hospital in an affluent area. The government does not want to penalize hospitals that see more complex patients, and so it allows hospitals to seek additional reimbursement forcomorbidities or complications that increase the cost of their care.

    This is where bump codes come from: Hospitals can bill more complex diverticulitis admissions as DRG 330, which is reimbursed at a higher rate. Not all comorbidities or complications count: In 2007, the last time DRGs were substantially changed, CMS analyzed claims data and used this analysis to decide which conditions qualify and set reimbursement rates. CMS pays hospitals more for patients with conditions like low sodium because it has found that it costs hospitals more to care for these patients (perhaps because they tend to be hospitalized longer and more often require ICU admissions).

    However, although CMS adjusts DRG payments from year to year, the list of bump codes hasn’t been overhauled in nearly two decades.

    Bump codes can help identify complex patients and ensure hospitals are paid more for caring for them. These are good things, in part because they reduce hospitals’ incentive to seek out healthier, more advantaged patients. While BCBS claims that hospitals are increasingly using these codes to bill more without actually providing more care, hospitals would presumably counter that they were being insufficiently reimbursed before, and that their coding is accurate. After all, the BCBS study does not claim that hospitals are engaging in fraud; the question is just whether the lab abnormalities hospitals are billing for warrant higher reimbursements.

    So who’s right?

    This issue boils down to the following question: How much more does it cost to care for a patient with a secondary condition, and do current coding rules accurately reflect this?

    The answer is that it depends. For instance, not all low sodium levels are created equal. If a patient briefly has a sodium level that falls below the normal range, but their sodium immediately corrects once they’re able to eat again, they probably don’t require any additional resources, and hospitals shouldn’t be reimbursed more for caring for them.

    By contrast, a patient with dangerously low sodium levels requiring an ICU stay, frequent lab checks, and carefully titrated IV fluids undoubtedly does use more resources.

    This leaves doctors in a tough spot: Risk adjustment specialists ask us to document real diagnoses that we know could increase the cost of a patient’s bill, but we have no idea by how much. Moreover, there’s no medical school module on how much any of these comorbidities affects the true cost of the hospitalization. Against this backdrop, it makes sense that doctors try to just tell the truth: yes, this patient has low sodium, and we are monitoring it, even though this probably allows hospitals to code some patients as being more resource-intensive than they truly are.

    What we can agree on

    This entire enterprise — risk adjustment specialists spamming doctors, who are already nose-deep in documentation burden, to document diagnoses that often do not affect patient care, while insurers publish reports that fail to capture the nuance of the issue, leaving the public angry and confused — highlights a more general problem with respect to how the U.S. health care system works.

    By design, hospitals and insurers are meant to compete with each other, with hospitals trying to collect as much money as they can for providing care, and insurers trying to pay as little as possible. Hospitals bolster their side by hiring risk adjustment specialists and employing AI tools, while health insurers hire payment integrity specialists and employ different AI tools.

    Patients lose out because the administrative bloat inflates the cost of medical care, while making costs less transparent and harder to contest. Ultimately, the fix should be structural: At a minimum, we need to overhaul the list of secondary conditions that are eligible for bump coding. CMS attempted to do this in 2019, when it proposed downgrading or eliminating many bump codes based on new data showing they were not associated with increased costs. But hospitals pushed back, and the effort eventually stalled.

    What should we do in the meantime?

    Secondary diagnoses are supposed to be billed only when they are clinically significant — for instance, when they require further evaluation, treatment, diagnostic procedures, or monitoring. But in practice, the bar for clinical significance is probably lower than it should be. (Even rechecking a lab may qualify as monitoring.) Accordingly, I suspect the BCBS study is tracking a real problem, and that much of the documentation of secondary diagnoses isn’t linked to patient complexity.

    Early in residency, I was caring for an immunosuppressed patient who kept spiking fevers. My colleagues and I wondered whether he might have an indolent infection lurking somewhere and ordered an echocardiogram to rule out endocarditis. His heart valves showed no signs of bacterial growth, but trace backflow was detected across one of his valves, a finding present in most people.

    Soon, I received a CDI query inviting me to document his valve dysfunction in my note. I did not do this, because his incidental valve finding was irrelevant to his hospitalization. Instead, I typed out a response indicating as much. However, it would have been easier and quicker to click through the check boxes, and, despite answering them honestly, potentially inflate the patient’s bill.

    At least some CDI tools built into electronic medical records — including the one I have used — default to including secondary diagnoses in ways that are likely to lead to bump coding. One way to improve the status quo would be to ensure that such tools give physicians the option to document whether a secondary diagnosis is clinically significant or not, rather than simply asking them how they are addressing it (on the presumption that it is clinically significant).

    Hospitals should build such tools, and regulators should ensure they do. In the meantime, I’ll exercise clinical judgment when using my CDI tool — if the low sodium seems important, I’ll document it, and if it doesn’t, I’ll politely decline when a risk adjustment specialist invariably asks me to.

    Leah Pierson is a resident physician.

  • STAT+: New Trump regulations would clean up health care pricing disclosures

    STAT+: New Trump regulations would clean up health care pricing disclosures

    Public drug price information is now coming next year, Trump officials say

    Mehmet Oz at a federal event on Monday in Washington announcing new health care price transparency rules.Finn Gomez/Getty Images

    By Bob Herman

    Oct. 5, 2026

    Bob Herman is the author of Health Care Inc., an award-winning weekly newsletter about the business of health and medicine.

    Bob covers the money in health care, focusing on health insurance and hospitals. His stories delve into Medicare Advantage, opaque prescription drug benefits, and how much executives actually make. He is also the author of the Health Care Inc. newsletter. You can reach Bob on Signal at bobjherman.09.

    The Trump administration released new regulations Monday that will force health insurance companies to publish cleaned-up spreadsheets of the prices that they pay hospitals and doctors, while stripping out meaningless data that clogged up the files.

    Trump officials also said they will start developing the system for disclosing prescription drug prices next month. A “hopeful” final plan for drug pricing data will come out by next May, said Mehmet Oz, the head of Medicare and Medicaid, at an event Monday. The government will enforce those requirements by the end of 2027. 

    Last year, the Trump administration punted on finalizing drug price disclosure rules, in a victory for drug companies and pharmacy benefit managers that have fiercely guarded their prices. 

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    1. Business of Health Care Reporter

      Bob covers the money in health care, focusing on health insurance and hospitals. His stories delve into Medicare Advantage, opaque prescription drug benefits, and how much executives actually make. He is also the author of the Health Care Inc. newsletter. You can reach Bob on Signal at bobjherman.09.

  • Hospitals Have a Little-Known Tool To Prevent Medical Debt. Here’s How It Works.

    Hospitals Have a Little-Known Tool To Prevent Medical Debt. Here’s How It Works.

    If you have medical debt, there’s a good chance you owe money to a hospital.

    One way patients can avoid medical debt is through hospital financial assistance, also known as charity care. Most of the nation’s hospitals offer free or discounted medical care to patients with very high medical debt or low incomes.

    Getting financial assistance, however, can be challenging. Many patients don’t know that hospitals offer financial help, surveys show, and complex application forms leave others stymied.

    Hospitals often demand that applicants turn over bank statements, pay stubs, tax returns, divorce filings, or other materials, and submit their applications in person, by mail, or by fax.

    “They don’t make it easy,” said Neale Mahoney, a Stanford University economist who studies medical debt.

    Such hurdles leave many patients with unpaid bills they should never have had to pay in the first place. In a single year, hospitals and health systems billed patients for at least $2 billion that they likely didn’t owe, one analysis found.

    As healthcare costs climb and more people lose their coverage, states and hospitals are testing an emerging approach to fix this problem: automatically screening patients to see if they qualify for assistance and proactively wiping out debt when they do. This is known as “presumptive eligibility.”

    Under this approach, patients may have the cost of their care wiped out before they see any bills — but not always. Hospitals differ on when, how, and for whom they use auto-enrollment, potentially impinging on patients’ finances.

    Here’s what you need to know about how auto-enrollment works.

    What is hospital financial assistance?

    In many states, hospitals set their own criteria for whom they provide financial aid. Eligibility is typically based on income for the patient’s entire household. The closer patients are to poverty, the less they have to pay. Patients with middle incomes and insurance are sometimes eligible for discounts, especially if their bills would gobble up a big chunk of what they earn.

    At least 11 states require hospitals to wipe out bills for low-income patients, though income cutoffs vary. Georgia, for example, mandates free care for anyone with income slightly above the federal threshold for poverty. In several states — including Oregon, North Carolina, and Maryland — patients can earn double that amount and still get free care.

    But in most states, many patients must complete applications to receive assistance.

    Several states in recent years have launched investigations and passed legislation designed to make it easier for people to get help. Research into medical debt, however, suggests gaps persist.

    How many hospitals use auto-enrollment?

    Nearly all nonprofit hospitals say they screen and automatically reduce bills for certain patients.

    Under the Affordable Care Act, nonprofit hospitals must make reasonable efforts to find people who are eligible for help before they take patients to court, sell their debt to collection agencies, or ding their credit over bills. Presumptive eligibility is one way hospitals can comply with the regulation, which took effect in 2016.

    In the first year under the new rules, about 70% of tax-exempt hospitals nationwide said they screened patients and proactively reduced bills, according to an analysis of federal data for Tradeoffs by the independent research institute RTI International. As of 2022, that figure was nearly 90%.

    The federal law doesn’t apply to for-profit and public hospitals, which don’t have to report the actions they take before going after patients for unpaid bills.

    In six states, policymakers require hospitals to use presumptive eligibility and skip applications for certain patients. Those states are California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, and Oregon.

    Who is eligible to be automatically enrolled in financial assistance?

    In most states, hospitals decide which patients can skip the application.

    Common groups automatically screened include people who are homeless, deceased, or already enrolled in state or federal programs to help low-income households with housing, food, or prescriptions. Other hospitals have more unique criteria, like Christus Health, which will write off bills for anyone in a religious order who took a vow of poverty.

    Eligibility criteria are often buried in official policies and hard to find or decipher. Some hospitals share little to no public information about whom they will proactively screen. Thirteen hospitals owned by Ascension, one of the nation’s largest Catholic health systems, state only that they may screen patients “with a sufficient unpaid balance.”

    Across the half-dozen states with presumptive eligibility mandates, eligibility rules vary. Maryland, for example, requires hospitals to proactively wipe out bills only for patients who already get government help for food or utilities but are ineligible for Medicaid. In Illinois, lawmakers created less-stringent requirements for rural hospitals compared with urban facilities.

    In Oregon, starting in 2024, hospitals had to screen anyone who owed more than $500 and every patient on Medicaid or who is uninsured. In 2025, roughly 80% of Oregon patients who got financial help with bills never filled out an application, based on data shared publicly by the first 26 hospitals to do so. The state’s legislature this year raised the screening threshold to include patients who owe at least $1,500 for a single visit.

    Without an application, how do hospitals figure out who gets help?

    Hospitals have several ways to find patients eligible for financial assistance.

    Typically, hospitals turn to public records, any information patients have previously volunteered, or tools from consumer credit companies to estimate whether patients qualify to have bills reduced.

    For example, if a hospital sees that a patient lives in a high-poverty ZIP code or has no address listed, that could be enough to deem them eligible. Many pay companies to run employment and credit checks on patients to determine whether they qualify for free care.

    Hospitals may also consider how likely patients are to pay bills, regardless of how much they earn. This is called “propensity to pay.” California and Oregon prohibit its use, concerned that hospitals may try to collect more often from people who dutifully pay their bills even though their incomes qualify them for financial assistance.

    When do hospitals screen patients for financial aid?

    It depends.

    Illinois, North Carolina, and Oregon require hospitals to screen certain patients before they send any bills. California hospitals will have to do the same starting in 2027.

    Some hospitals voluntarily screen patients before sending bills; others try to collect money from patients first. As long as they screen patients before suing them for very overdue bills, hospitals can stay within the letter of the federal law that pushed many of them to embrace presumptive eligibility.

    For example, the policy of Christus Health is to screen patients only “after all other eligibility and payment sources have been exhausted.”

    Anna Stelter, vice president of policy for the Texas Hospital Association, said hospitals want to investigate other options for payment — like Medicaid or county safety net programs — before they give out financial assistance.

    “We do want to make sure that whoever is financially responsible for that care is identified and pays,” Stelter said. “Charity care is the relief of last resort.”

    Hospitals’ publicly posted policies may also be fuzzy about when they will screen for patients likely eligible for help. For example, Cook Children’s Health Care System in Fort Worth, Texas, says its goal is to determine a patient’s eligibility “as soon as sufficient information is available.”

    Who pays the bills when patients get free care?

    In one sense, we all do. Taxpayers cover some or all of the cost of financial assistance, though the amount varies by hospital.

    About half the nation’s hospitals are nonprofit and legally get a pass on paying most taxes. KFF estimates that nonprofit hospitals pocketed $24 billion in 2020 that they would otherwise have paid as income, sales, or property taxes.

    Government-owned and for-profit hospitals have their own sets of tax benefits to help offset costs for low-income patients. Government hospitals often get additional taxpayer support, and for-profit hospitals generally receive smaller government subsidies, like additional payments for caring for high numbers of uninsured and Medicaid patients.

    Whether taxpayer dollars fully cover hospitals’ costs for financial assistance depends on the amount of government support they receive — information often not publicly available. It also hinges on how many patients need help, how many meet hospitals’ criteria for assistance, and how many get through an application. Research shows hospitals spend widely different amounts on financial assistance, from less than 1% of yearly expenses to more than 7%.

    Philanthropy and hospitals’ income cover costs not absorbed by tax dollars.

    This article is part of “Hidden Help,” an investigative series from Tradeoffs and KFF Health News about how hospitals can protect their patients from the life-altering harms of medical debt.

    Melanie Evans is a reporter for Tradeoffs, a nonprofit newsroom reporting on healthcare’s toughest choices. Sign up for the weekly newsletter to get the latest stories every Thursday morning.

    Tradeoffs’ reporting for this series was supported, in part, by the California Health Care Foundation, the National Institute for Health Care Management Foundation, and the Solutions Journalism Network.